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CLASS WARFARE: PREVENTING INVESTOR CASUALTIES BY
IMPORTING ENGLAND'S GLO INTO AMERICA'S CLASS

ACTION ARBITRATIONS
Alissa Piccione*
INTRODUCTION
The latest skirmish in securities law over mandatory arbitration clauses began when
The Carlyle Group included a mandatory arbitration clause in its Initial Public Offering (IPO)
prospectus.! The mandatory arbitration clause was designed to preclude courtroom class
actions, which are investors' primary weapon against issuer fraud. 2 The Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) counter-attacked by threatening to thwart the Carlyle Group's offering if
it refused to remove the clause from its prospectus. 3 Although the Carlyle Group waived its
white flag and removed the offending clause, it is likely that other firms or companies that
want to go public will challenge the SEC's position that mandatory arbitration clauses are
void, 4 arming themselves with pro-business recommendations from former SEC Chairman
Chris Cox 5 and the recent flurry of pro-arbitration Supreme Court decisions.6
The Carlyle Group kerfuffle although a rogue attack, in that most IPO issuers have
yet to dare include mandatory arbitration clauses in their prospectuses 7 demonstrates a
general preference for arbitration by defendants when in disputes with investors.' This
preference is supported with ample approval from the courts, which have long recognized that
arbitration is beneficial and that federal policy demands its use.'

*J.D. Candidate, 2014, Hofstra University School of Law. I Would like to thank Professor Colesanti and the
Hofstra La i Journal of InternationalBusiness and Lawi for their contributions to this Note.
See Ralph C. Ferrara & Stacy A. Puente, Holding IPOs Hostage to Class Actions: Mandatory Arbitration
Clauses in IPOs, SEC. LITIG.REP., April 2012, at 1,1. The Carlyle Group is a private equity firm. Id
2 See id.
See id.
4 Seeid. at7.
5 See Edward Pekarek & Genevieve Shingle, Case Comment, The Land of Litigation Make Believe: Janus
Capital Group, Inc., et al. v. First Derivative Traders, 19 PIABA B.J., no. 1, at 1, 7 (2012). President George
W. Bush had appointed Christopher Cox Chairman of the SEC in 2005. Id. Cox, a well-known conservative,
initiated a shift in the SEC's policies that was more favorable to business interests. Id.
6 See Ferrara & Puente, supra note 1,at 6.
See Karen Singh Tyagi & Gide Loyrette Nouel, CarIlyle Leaves Out Mandatory Arbitration Clause in IPO,
KLUWER ARE. BLOC (Feb. 7, 2012), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.corblog/2012/02/07/carlyle-leaves-outmandator -arbitration-clause-in-ipoi; Ferrara & Puente, supranote 1,at 4.Although the Carlyle Group was one
of the first to include a mandatory arbitration clause in itsIPO prospectus, the idea is not novel. Ferrara &
Puente, supra note 1,at 4. For example, Royal Dutch Shell included a mandatory arbitration clause in its
Articles of Association. Id.Likewise, Frmuldii Firs! Finqnciai Coip. sought to include an wbimrtion ptovision
iiitschattr and byaws in !990, when itwas planning irsIPO Tyagi & Nouel, supra. Howv er,the SEC
Firmly otbjtcttd
to Franklin's ai.ttnpt. k .
' See Ferrara & Puente, supra note 1,at 6.
9 See, e.g, AT&T Mobility LLC v.Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011) ("[0]ur cases place it beyond
dispute that the FAA was designed to promote arbitration.").
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The SEC has been reluctant to take direct action against mandatory arbitration
clauses, despite its gambit to block them from IPO registration materials. 10 The Dodd-Frank
Act expressly requires the SEC to study mandatory arbitration clauses and grants the SEC the
authority to make a rule prohibiting such clauses.11 However,
after completing a study, 12 the
13
authority.
SEC decided not to exercise its rule-making
The SEC's self-regulatory organization, 14 the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA), 15 permits mandatory arbitration for disputes between broker/dealers and
investors.16 Ever since Rodriguez de Quias v. Shearson/AmericanExpress, Inc.,1mandatory
arbitration clauses have been boilerplate in broker/dealers' contracts with their customers and
have been continually enforced. 8 Arbitrations between broker/dealers and customers are
usually under FINRA's jurisdiction. 19
FINRA places minimal restrictions on mandatory arbitration clauses between
broker/dealers and their customers as well as the subsequent arbitrations resulting from
them.20 First, FINRA forbids broker/dealers from including waivers of access to courtroom
class actions in customer agreements. 21 However, in a recent FINRA action against Charles
Schwab, the arbitration panel held that FINRA Rule 12204, which prohibits courtroom class
action waivers, was unenforceable because it conflicted with the Federal Arbitration Act

"

See Massachusetts Calls On SEC To Prohibit RIAs From Using Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, Saying It Is
"Troubling, " Widespread And Not Consistent With Fiduciary Practice, ADVISORS4ADVISORS (February 13,
2013, 12:48 PM), http://advisors4advisors.com/compliance/registered-investment-advisors/article/17202m as sa chusett scalls- on-se c-to-p rohib it-ri as- from-u sin
g-man dat ory- arb itr
ation- cla ses-sayin g-it- is- qtro ub lingqwidespread-and-not-consistent-with-fiduciary-practice ("Dodd Frank legislation empowered the SEC in July
2010 to eliminate the practice of mandatory arbitration clauses in broker/dealer agreements, but the SEC has
not acted on this.").
11See id.
12See SEC, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 134 (2011), http://www.sec.gov
/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf ("[d]uring the Dodd- Frank Act legislative process, concerns were raised
regarding mandatory-pre-dispute arbitration, including costs and limited grounds for appeal, among others.").
'" See Ferrara & Puente, supra note 1, at 4.
'4 Self-regulatory organizations (SROs) function as self-policing mechanisms for the securities industry.
They
create rules for themselves that must comply with § 6 of the Securities Exchange Act, and the SEC is
authorized to take enforcement actions against SROs if they fail to perform their regulatory duties. Deepa
Sarkar, Self Regulatory Organization, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/self regulatory
organization (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).
15"FINRA is the largest independent regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United States.
FINRA's mission is to protect America's investors by making sure the securities industry operates fairly and
honestly.... FINRA oversees about 4,275 brokerage firms, about 161,495 branch offices and approximately
630,010 registered securities representatives." About the FinancialIndustry Regulatory Authority, FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (2013).
" See FINRA Rule 12200 Arbitration Under an Arbitration Agreement or the Rules of FINRA, available at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display main.html?rbid2403&element id=4106 (2013).
17See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (overruling Wilko v. Swan and
holding that claims under the Securities Exchange Act were arbitrable).
IS See Rhonda Wasserman, Legal Process in A Box, or What Class Action Waivers Teach Us About LaiiMaking, 44 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 391, 416 (2012).
19 See id.

See FINRA Rule 12204 Class Action Claims, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_
main.html?rbid=2403&element id=4110 (2013).
21 id.
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(FAA).22 The effects of the panel's decision have yet to be seen. Second, FINRA prohibits
class actions in arbitrations without defining what a class action is. 2 3 FINRA should
reexamine its own Rules governing mandatory arbitrations, in light of Dodd-Frank and the
fact that FINRA Rule 12204 was deemed unenforceable against a brokerage firm.
Like the Second Circuit in In re American Exp. Merchant's Litigation ("Amex
24
Lip,),
FINRA recognizes the dangers of class action waivers. However, FINRA has never
pushed the Amex I1 argument to its logical conclusion. In Amex 111, the court explained that
the high costs of separately arbitrating intricate claims can grossly outweigh the gains for
25
The court tersely stated, "[O]nly a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.,,26
each plaintiff.
Therefore, the court held, plaintiffs are prevented from vindicating their federal rights.2
Amex I1 dealt with federal antitrust law, 28 but the court's reasoning is equally
applicable to federal securities law.29 Investor claims against broker/dealers under the
Securities Exchange Act are factually complicated and yield high investigatory costs, which
may be greater than the potential reward. 30 Therefore, forbidding collective action for
investors under these circumstances precludes legitimate securities claims from receiving
redress, and allows broker/dealer power to remain unchecked. 31
Although touting itself as investors' white knight, the SEC stopped short of going as
far as the court in Amex 11 went by maintaining its prohibition against class actions in the
arbitral forum.32 Collective arbitration of investors' federal securities claims against
broker/dealers can be a desirable and even necessary alternative to bilateral arbitration or
class litigation. 3 For example, an investor with a small claim is likely to have difficulties
meeting the stringent requirements for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (FRCP) 23 . Thus, the investor would be locked out of the courtroom and forced
to arbitrate individually against the broker.
22

Jed Horowitz, Schwab gets OK to ban client class-action suits,

REUTERS

(February

21,

2013),

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/21 /schwab-fine-arbitration-idUSL1NOBL96S20130221.
Charles
Schwab's account agreements with its customers were modified to ban its customers from participating in
courtroom class actions against Charles Schwab. Id. FINRA maintained that the ban violated Rule 12204. Id.
However, the arbitration panel determined that Rule 12204 was unenforceable. Id Therefore, Charles Schwab
is legally permitted to ban customer class action lawsuits via its customer agreements. Id.
13 FINRA Rule 12204, supra note 20.
24 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012), rev. d sub nom., Am. Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant, No. 12-133, slip op.
(U.S. June 20, 2013).

15Id. at 217.

26 Id. at 214 (quoting Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7 thCir. 2004)).
21

Id. at217.

28 See id. at 208.

29 See Sen. A] Franken, Sen. Robert Menendez & Sen. Richard Blumenthal, Senators Urge SEC to Oppose
Forced Arbitrationfor ShareholderDisputes, 9 No. 3 SEC. LITIG. REP., March 2012, at 19,19 ("[i]ndividual,

confidential arbitration of complex securities claims required by Carlyle Group LP's registration papers would
effectively foreclose the vindication of its investors' statutory rights under the Exchange Act.....
0

See id.
See id.

32 See FINRA Rule 12204, supra note 20. The court in Amex III approves of class arbitration when a federal

right is at stake. See Amex I1, 557 F.3d 204. FINRA does not. See FINRA Rule 12204, supra note 20.
See generallyAmex II, 557 F.3d 204.
34 See Karen Sandrik, Notes and Comments, Overlooked Tool: PromissoryFraudin the Class Action Context,
35 FLA. ST.U. L. REv. 193, 202 (2007).
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Individual arbitration is really not an option for small claims because the potential
reward is likely to be too small to make individual arbitration feasible. 3 ' Most lawyers Will
not represent investors in arbitration when the claims are small."
Law schools created
securities arbitration clinics to take small claims that lawyers reject. 3' However, only a
handful of law schools operate securities arbitration clinics, primarily on the East and West
Coasts.3 8 Additionally, these security arbitration clinics place their own dollar maximums on
the claims that they will take.39 Therefore, some investor plaintiffs are still prevented from
vindicating their federal securities rights.
Nonetheless, the SEC's apprehension toward class action arbitration is not baseless.
Class actions are poorly defined.40 The weaknesses of class actions are amplified when
moved from the courtroom into arbitration. 1 In general, class action arbitration was recently
condemned by the Supreme Court in American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant 42(the
Supreme Court's reversal of Amex III) and AT&TMobility LLC v.Concepcion,3 as well as by
the SEC. 44 But other legal scholars have criticized the Supreme Court's tongue-lashing in
Concepcion and have exposed some of the faulty reasoning behind the arguments against
class action arbitration. 4iJustice Kagan, in her passionate Italian Colors dissent, explained
that the vindication of federal rights doctrine should have been applied to invalidate the
mandatory, bilateral arbitration clause.4 6
The SEC's stance on class action arbitration is one that prohibits an arbitration
procedure that conforms to FRCP 23. However, FINRA arbitrations are not bound by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, a FINRA class action arbitration rule would not
have to parrot FRCP 23. Other countries have learned from the United States' mistakes
regarding class actions and have developed their own collective litigation procedures.47
Specifically, England's group litigation order (GLO) is a strong alternative to American class
actions in the arbitral forum. 48 A GLO is non-representative, opt-in"9 and has fewer

5ee Amex 11,557 F.3d at 2 17.
See Arbitration!AfediationClinics in Califbrnia,Districtof Columbia, Florida,Illinois, Massac husetts, NewI
Jersey, Aew York, and Pennsvlania SEC, http:,,w-.sec.gov answAers/arbclin.htmg (last
modified Mar. 8,
36

2013).
37Id.

Id.
Id.
4 See Securities Litigarion

of 2005, 28 ,

Ufoirm

S oandards Act of 99

15 ,S,C. § 77p (2011); Class Action Fairness Act

§ 1711 (2011).

41See generally Emanwel Josef Turnbull, Opting Out of the Procedua/ Morass: A Solution to the Class
Arbitration Problem, WIDENER L. REV. (forthcoming spring 2013), available a http:,ssm.com/abstract

=2196921 (arguing that American class action procedures are unsuitable for arbitration).
42Am.Express v.Italian Colors Restaurant, No. 12-133, slip op. at 8-9 (U.S. June 20, 2013).
43See AT&T Mobility LLC v.Concepcion, 131 S.Ct 1740, 1750-52 (2011).
44See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Exclusion of Class Actions From Arbitration
Proceedings, Release No. 34-31371 57 Fed. Reg. 52659 (Nov. 4,1992).
45 See Turnbull, supra note 41 (manuscript at 14-15).
46 Italian Colors Restaurant, No. 12-133, slip op. at 3-13(Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
47See Turnbull, supra note 41 (mamscript at 1).
48See id. But see Stephen C. Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action - Part I: The Industrializationof
Group Litigation, 27 UCLA L. REV. 514, 514-15 (1979).
4' Turnbull, supranote 41(manuscript at 27). To "opt-in" a plaintiff inust request to be added to the G LO.Id.
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requirements for class certification than FRCP 23.
These characteristics make the GLO
more flexible than rigid American class actions, and, therefore, a better match for arbitration,
a dispute resolution mechanism known for its fluidity.5'
Accordingly, this Note advocates that FINRA lower its barricade and embrace class
actions in arbitration by striking the prohibitive language in Rule 1220452 and replacing it
with an express grant of authority for investors to file a class action in FINRA arbitrations.
FINRA should discard Rule 12312, which provides for joinder of claims, 3 and promulgate a
new rule for class action arbitration, which defines a class as two or more plaintiffs and
establishes class procedures based on England's GLO.
Part I of this Note will detail the history of the Supreme Court's acceptance of
arbitration. It will show that, even despite Italian Colors and Concepcion, class actions could
serve an important role in FINRA arbitrations. Part i1will explain why FINRA's current
Rule prohibiting class actions in arbitration should be changed. Part III will highlight the
weaknesses of American class action litigation, and explain that, if FINRA were to draft a
rule for class action arbitration, it should not copy FRCP 23. And Part IV will explain why
GLOs are more advantageous for use in arbitration than American class action litigation. It
will draw the contours of the GLO-based class action in arbitration rule that FINRA ought to
consider.
PART 1:THE ARBITRATION WAR IN THE L.S. COUJRTS
Like class action arbitrations today, bilateral arbitrations were once met with
hostility by U.S. courts) 4 However, arbitration underwent a metamorphosis, and the courts
are now staunch supporters of arbitration." Therefore, it is likely that class action arbitrations
are destined for acceptance from the courts in the future.
A) Declaring War
Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 to compel courts to honor and enforce valid
arbitration agreements regularly. ' Previously, the courts did not trust arbiters to handle
claims brought under federal statutes, and viewed arbitration with contempt. Even after the

50

See id.(manuscript at 27-28).

See id.
(manuscript at 1).
51 See FINRA Rule 12204, snipranote 20.
5

5'See FINRA Rule 12312 Multiple Claimants, available al http:/finra.complinet.com/eldisplay/display.html
?rbid-2403&record id-5213&element id-4134&highlight-12312#r5213.
51 See Cirroll F. Neesernini etal.,
The Lair
cnn
a
S(
RS
ARPrAo, 2001 : HOW
DO I)0A O I x tO
) I]DO
1,1
'F , 165, 10 (P1,1
Corp. I.a &
ic Cours, ,
iPrct
kadool
Series, 201 1).
55See generallv Edward P. Boyle & David N. Cinotti, Beyond Vondiscrimination AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion and the Further Federalizationof US. Arbitration La, 12 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 373 (2012)
(noting that the Supreme Court has evolved in its interpretation of the FAA over the last
50 years).
56 Id. at 375.
57 See Y e
r nr I s pra note 54. aI169 ("The legislative intent behind the FAA wxas to place an arbitration
agreement 'upon the same tooting as other contracts, wxhere it
belongs .....
51 See id at 170.
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passage of the FAA, courts were reluctant to enforce arbitration agreements, when the
underlying claim involved a federal right. 9
In Wilko v. Swan, 60 decided in 1953, the Court articulated its distrust of arbitration
for a claim filed under the Securities Act of 1933 (' 3 3 Act).6 1 Wilko is factually similar to the
types of cases to which this Note pertains: ones in which there is a bilateral arbitration
agreement between the parties, an alleged violation of federal securities law, and an investor
plaintiff battling a broker defendant.
Petitioner Wilko, a customer, claimed that his broker, the respondent, made
misrepresentations and omissions, which induced him to buy 1,600 shares of Air Associates
stock and then sell it at a loss. 62 The petitioner filed a complaint for damages, and the
3
respondent moved to stay the action until the parties arbitrated, pursuant to their agreement.
However, § 14 of the '33 Act, provides, "Any condition, stipulation, or provision
binding any perscn acquiring any securit to, waive compliance with any provision of this
subchaptier or of ihe rules and regulaions of ihe Commission shll be void ' 64
terefere t1_
issue before the Court was whether an arbitralion agrement covering all disoutes including
those that had ei io arise was a waixer under § 14) 5 'he Curt answered that question
affirmatively and required ajudicial forum to, protec the substantivt rights granted by the '33
Act 6( The Court staltd. "As the prctective
crvisicns of tihe Securities Act require the
exercise of iudicial direction to fair assure their effectiveness, it stems to us that Congress
must have intended § 14 io appN tc waiver of iudicial trial and review' ' (
After "Vilko, the Court spent tiwen!, wars refusing tc honor arbinarion agretmnems
when claims were filed for viilations of the '33 Act, as well as the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 ('34 Act) ( It was not until Merk r- A/A rto Culver. in i9'/4. that the Courts
e
et
bean c shift 69 In that case, an American manufacturer b4ught tiree Gennan
businesses, with their tiradenarks, frnm a German sller.
fle see
made express
warranttes in the sales contract that the trademarks were free frni encumibrances
When
tic buyer' discovcred that the trademarks were subject to substantial encumbrances, he asked
the seller to rescind the contract., 2 The seller refused, and the respondent sued, alleging that
the seller violated § 10(b) of the '34 Act and Rule 1Ob-5 by making fraudulent representations
about the trademarks,

'

See id.

346 U.S. 427 (1953).
615 U.S.C. § 77a-77nm (2011).
6 Wiko, 346 U.S. at 429.
63

id.

64 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2011).
6' Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430.
6 See i

Id. at 437.
61 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78kk (2011).
6) Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
67

Id. at 508.
Id.

72 Id. at

509.

73 id
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The sales contract contained an arbitration clause stating that any claim arising from
the contract or its breach wuuld be referreil tc arbitration before theintnmaional Chamber of
Comerce in Paris, Franc-. and tliai illinois law would govern tlieagreemnt1 4 The seller
icoved to dismiiss on alitnmaively, sav t proceedings.
The case made it to the Supreme Court), and the Court enfirced tljearbitration
agreemem.7 The Court disiinguishd SJWrL from 1,i4ko on inernaional policy grounds.
sta ing tlha 'lie
contract in >1erk was a "truly intrnmainal agremnt '7 The businesses sold
under the contract were "organized under the laws of, and primarily situated in, European
countries, whose activities were largely, if not entirely, directed to European markets."' OS
Therefore, it was necessary for the parties to specify which country's laws should govern
potential disputes and the appropriate forum, which they did. Had the Court failed to honor
the choice of law agreement and arbitration agreement it would, "invite the unseemly and
mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure tactical litigation advantages."Sl For
example, if the seller had known that the United States could enjoin the arbitration and permit
the buyer to litigate the claim, the seller might have sought an order from France to enjoin the
buyer from litigating in the United States.8 2 The Court 3explained that failure to honor
arbitration agreements would inhibit international business.S
B) The Tide Turns
Even after Sherk, the Court clung to Tiilko, so long as the contract at issue did not
involve foreign entitiesi 4 However, the Court turned its back on 14iM7o in 1987, and
Shearson American Express, Inc. v. Allci/ahon and Rodriguez de Oujas v.
Shearson American Express, Inc. ushered in an era of pro-arbitrationgt which has endured for
over twenty years. 86
In McMahon, the Court held that a § 10(b) claim and a RICO claim were both
arbitrable.s The McMahons lost because they failed to meet their burden; they were unable
to show that Congress intended to prohibit waivers ofjudicial remedies for their claims."
74

id.,

Id.

7Id. at 5 10.
77 Id. at519.
71 Id.at 517.
71 Id.at 515.
s

Id.
IId. at516-17.

Id.at517.

93 id.

See Neesernr
,,unra note -54, t 170-7 ,
See id at 172.
86 See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v.Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011) (a pro-arbitration decision
rendered twenty-tour years after Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMallon was decided).
84
85

17 Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMalhon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
8' Id.at 226-27 ("The Arbitration Act, standing alone, therefore mandates enforcement of agreements to

arbitrate statutory claims. Like ary statutory directive, the Arbitration Act's mandate may be overridden by a
contrary congressional command. The burden is on the party opposing arbitration, however, to show that
Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights atissue.").
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First, the Court addressed the § 10(b) claim, and rejected the McMahons' argument
that § 29(a) of the '34 Act forbids waiver of § 27 of the statute, which states 1ha.'
The district courts of the United States ...
shall have exclusive jurisdiction
of violations of this title or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all
suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty
created by this title or the rules and regulations thereunder.8 9
The Court explained that § 29(a) only states that compliance with a '34 Act provision cannot
be waived, and § 27 is a jurisdictional provision that does not embody any duty with which
one must comply. 90 Therefore, waiving § 27 is not waiving compliance with any duty created
by the '34 Act, and an arbitration agreement does not violate § 29(a). 9'
Second, the Court distinguished § 29(a) of the '34 Act from § 14 of the '33 Act, the
provision at issue in [lilko.92 Although the two provisions have similar wording, § 14 of the
'33 Act, the Court explained, was viewed by the [1ilko Court as precluding waiver of a
jurisdictional provision. 9 However, the Court continued, the [1ilko Court's interpretation
resulted from its belief that arbitration was an inadequate forum for enforcing the provisions
of the '33 Act, and "a judicial forum was needed to protect the substantive rights created by
the... ['33] Act., 94 The Court explained, that, since 14ilko was decided, arbitration had
9
significantly improved.
' Therefore, arbitration was an adequate forum within which to
96
enforce the '34 Act.
Next, the Court tackled the McMahons' second argument: that § 29(a) should be
interpreted as a protection against a broker's superior bargaining power. 9 The McMahons
relied, again, on [1ilko, reasoning that brokerage agreements were not freely negotiated, and
that Congress intended for § 29(a) to protect customers from the pressure to relinquish their
rights. 98 However, the Court rejected this argument because "the voluntariness of the
agreement is irrelevant" to compliance with the '34 Act.99
The McMahons further argued that arbitration would weaken their right to recover
under the Act and would therefore be a waiver of their § 10(b) rights. 10 0 The Court

'9 Id. at 227. ("The MeMahons coniend. howev er. thar
congressional inlent
to requireajaidieial forum for the
lcsodutlio
of 10(b) cl 's can bc dcdufcd
'5-e
3 29(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a), which
declares void '[a]ny condition, stipulation,
or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any
provision of [the Act].').
9'Id.at 228.
9! Id.

93

94
0'

id.
id.
Id. at 233 ("Even ifWilko s assumptions regarding arbitration were valid at the time (lko

was decided,

most certainly they do not hold true today for arbitration procedures subject to the SEC's oversight authority.").
9)6id.

Id. at 229.
90Id. at230.
97

9 Id.

...id.
at 231.
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acknowledged that this argument was "the heart of the Court's decision in Hlilko," but
held
11
that it was invalid, given the significant advancements made in arbitration since Ul71ko.
Finally, the Court rejected the last argument pertaining to the McMahons' § 10(b)
claim, which was that Congress' intent for Hlilko to apply when parties with pre-arbitration
agreements are disputing § 10(b) claims can be inferred from its failure to address arbitration
13
102
as well as from its reference to Uilko in its Conference Report. 0
when amending 28(b),
However, the Court disagreed with the interpretation, and specifically stated that, from the
Conference Report, it was clear that Congress intended for the courts to handle the "'Uilko
issue., 104 Once the Court completed its analysis of the § 10(b) claim, it moved to the RICO
claim, and decided that that claim must be arbitrated as well. 105
Although the McMahon Court chipped away at U ilko, it refused to overrule it.' °6
However, two yeats later, in Rodriguez de Qujas v. ShearsonAmerican Express, Inc., the
Court overruled Hlilko, and held that pre-dispute agreements to atbitrate claims under the '34
Act were valid and enforceable.'1°
The Court felt that the inconsistency between Hlilko and McMahon needed to be
resolved in order for the '34 Act and the '33 Act to have a "harmonious construction" to
"discourage litigants from manipulating their allegations merely to cast their claims under one
of the securities laws rather than another."l S Therefore, the Court overruled U ilko, and
reiterated the McMahon holding that the atbitration process does not "inherently" prevent the
exercise of substantive rights granted by the '33 Act. 1°°
As a result of the Court's willingness to enforce pre-dispute atbitration agreements,
arbitration agreements became a staple in business contracts. 11 However, an issue that
emerged was whether mandatory arbitration clauses precluded class action atbitration. M In
Green Tree FinancialCorp. v. Bazzle, the Supreme Court addressed the issue, but left the
ultimate answer to atbitrators! 12
The arbitration agreements at the heart of Green Tree read as follows:

10l Id.

'0'
'0

Id. at 234-35.
Id. at 236-37 ("The Conference Report states: 'The Senate bill amended section 28 of the Securities

Exchange Act of 1934 with respect to arbitration proceedings between self-regulatory organizations and their
participants, members, or persons dealing with members or participants. The House amendment contained no
comparable provision. The House receded to the Senate. It was the clear understanding of the conferees that
this amendment did not change existing law, as articulated in I1'lko v. Sian, 346 U.S. 427 [74 S.Ct. 182, 98
L.Ed. 168] (1953), concerning the effect of arbitration proceedings provisions in agreements entered into by
persons dealing with members and participants of self-regulatory organizations. ') (quoting H.R.Conf Rep. No.
94-229, p.2 111 (1975)).
...
id. at 38.
'05 Id. at 238-42. The Court reiected that the RICO claim should be litigated in court, even though RICO claims

can result in criminal liability and even though the public has an interest in RICO claims. Id
116 See Nc semarm, /
te 5, at 7-71.
117 Id. at 172.
' Rodriguez de Quijas v. ShearsoniAm. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989).
'0' Id. at 486.
"' See G. Richard Shell, Aritration and CorporateGovernance, 67 N.C. L. REV. 517, 517 (1989).
H See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
12 See id. at 453.
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ARBITRATION-All disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or
relating to this contract or the relationships which result from this contract
...
shall be resolved by binding arbitrationby one arbitratorselected by us
with consent of you. This arbitration contract is made pursuant to a
transaction in interstate commerce, and shall be governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act at 9 U.S.C. section 1....
THE PARTIES VOLUNTARILY
AND KNOWINGLY WAIVE ANY RIGHT THEY HAVE TO A JURY
TRIAL, EITHER PURSUANT TO ARBITRATION UNDER THIS
CLAUSE OR PURSUANT TO A COURT ACTION BY U.S. (AS
PROVIDED HEREIN)....The parties agree and understand that the
arbitrator shall have all powers provided by the law and the contract. These
powers shall include all legal and equitable remedies, including, 113
but not
limited to, money damages, declaratoiy relief, and injunctive relief.
The North Carolina Supreme Court had held that the agreement was silent on the issue of
whether the parties could arbitrate as a class, while Green Tree argued that the agreement
prohibited class arbitration.' 4 The Supreme Court found that it was not impossible for the
arbitration agreement to be read as not prohibiting class arbitration.. and, thus, "silent" on
the matter.' 6 However, the Court refused to "automatically accept" the North Carolina
Supreme Court's interpretation of the arbitration clause.' 7 Instead, the Court reasoned that,
because the parties had agreed to submit all contractual disputes to arbitration, and divergent
opinions as to the meaning of the contract were such a dispute, the interpretation question
should have been submitted to an arbitrator to resolve, not a court.'" Therefore, the Court
remanded the case to arbitration for the interpretation issue. 9
The Court again confronted the issue of whether class arbitration is permissible in
Stolt-Vielsen S.A. v.AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp.120 Pursuant to Green Tree, the parties in StoltNielsen submitted the issue of whether their arbitration agreement permitted class arbitration
of antitrust claims to an arbitration panel to decide.' 2' However, before handing the matter
over to the 2arbitrator, the parties stipulated that the arbitration agreement itself was "silent" on
12
the issue.
The arbitration panel decided that the arbitration clause permitted class arbitration,
based upon evidence that, according to the panel, tended to show that the parties did not
intend to preclude arbitration.123 Furthermore, the panel was persuaded by the fact that other
id.
at 448.
Id. at 450.
"sId. at 451.
116 Id. at 450.
17 id.at 451.
.. id.
at 451-52.
...id.
at 454.
12 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 10 S,Ct, i758
(2010).
121Id. at 1765.
122 Id. at 1766 ("Counsel fbr AnimalFeeds explained to the arbitration panel that the term
'silent' did not
simply mean that the clause made no express reference to class
arbitration. Rather, he said, '[a]I the parties
agree that when a contract is silent on an issue there's been no agreement that has been reached on that
issue.').
12iid.
14
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arbitrators, resolving other interpretation disputes, often found that the clauses in controversy
permitted class arbitration.' 2'
However, the Court held that the panel's decision was unenforceable 12 'because the
panel, according to the Court, "dispens[ed] [its] own brand of industrial justice.' ' i x The Court
explained that the arbitrators failed to complete their task, which was to "identify the rule of
law that govern[ed]" the dispute; the panel should have looked to the FAA or maritime law or
New York law to find a default provision to fill the "silent" part of the arbitration
agreement. 12 7 But because the panel failed to engage in such an inquiry, and, instead, based
its decision on past arbitrations, the panel "simply imposed its own conception of sound
policy." 128 Furthermore, the Court chastised the panel for alleging that the ruling was based
on the perceived intent of the parties because the intent of the parties was unambiguous: the
parties had stipulated that the agreement was silent because no understanding had been
1
reached on this issue.
Therefore, it was beyond the scope of the panel's job to ask what the
30
was.'1
parties' intent
After explaining the panel's error, the Court clarified that Green Tree "did net
3 1esrablish he rule re be applid in deciding whetier class arbiriaion is Permirtei' '
Furhermore, the Court rhiien held rthat
"aparty may not be compelled under the FAA to submit
to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to
do so.' 31 Therefore, the arbitration agreement in Stolt-Nielsen did not permit class arbitration
because there was no evidence in the clause that the parties agreed to permit class
arbitration.'133 The parties expressly stipulated
that the agreement was silent, and, thus, there
13
was no agreement to arbitrate as a class. 1
C) A Victory for Arbitration: Concepcion
Following the Court's decision in Green Tree, potential defendants included class
waivers in their arbitration agreements,13 5 insulating themselves from unwittingly arbitrating
or litigating against a class. However, some jurisdictions, like California, found that class
waivers were unconscionable, while other jurisdictions did not. 13 Therefore, the Supreme
Court felt it was necessary to resolve the split, and agreed to hear AT&T Mobility LLC v.
1

Concepcion. 37

124 Itd.

125-d. at 1770.
126 Id. at

1767 (quoting Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)).

117id.at 1768-69.

...id.at 1769.
"9 id.at 1770.
130 Itd.

131Id. at 1772.
132Id. at 1775.

'3:id.at 1776.
'3'id.at 1775.
135Jan-Krzysztof Dunin-Wasowicz, Note and Comment, Collective Redress in InternationalArbitration: An
AmericanIdea,a European Concept?,22 AvI.REv.INT'L AiB. 285,298 (2011).
136 Id.
137See id.
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In that case, the arbitration agreement required that all claims be brought
individually. 3 ' In addition, the agreement included the following terms, as described by the
Court:
AT&T must pay all costs for nonfrivolous claims; that arbitration must
take place in the county in which the customer is billed; that, for claims of
$10,000 or less, the customer may choose whether the arbitration proceeds
in person, by telephone, or based only on submissions; that either party
may bring a claim in small claims court in lieu of arbitration; and that the
arbitrator may award any form of individual relief, including injunctions
and presumably punitive damages. The agreement, moreover, denies
AT&T any ability to seek reimbursement of its attorney's fees, and, in the
event that a customer receives an arbitration award greater than AT&T's
last written settlement offer, requires AT&T to pay a $7,500 minimum
recovery and twice the amount of the claimant's attorney's fees.39
The Concepcions filed their claim in United States District Court for the Southern District of
California, and the claim was consolidated into a class action. 14 AT&T moved to compel
arbitration, but the Concepcions opposed the motion. 141 Citing the Discovery Bank rule, 142
the Concepcions alleged that the class waiver was unconscionable under California contract
law and that the clause triggered the savings clause of the FAA. 14 After unfavorable rulings
for AT&T in the lower courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 144
The Supreme Court explained that the savings clause of the FAA excluded contract
defenses that are based on the contract's nature as an arbitration agreement or are only
applicable to arbitration. 4' The Court held that the Discover Bank rule qualifies as such an

'3' AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011).
139

id.

140

Id.

Id. at 1744-45.
1
The Discoverv Bank rule is:
[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which
disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages,
and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a
scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums
of money, then ... the waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the party 'from
responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful iijury to the person or property of another.'
Under these circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under Calitornia law and
should not be enforced."
Id. at 1746 (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148, 162 (2005)).
143Id. "A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereatler arising out of such contract or transaction ... shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
144 Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1745.
115 id. at 1746.
141
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excluded defense, 4 " and, therefore, does not trigger the savings clause.' 7 Furthermore, the
Court states that § 2 of the FAA, a federal law requiring the enforcement of arbitration
agreements, prempts 'alifirnia's Discover Bank rule, which obstructs rhe federal Pclicx of
enforcing arbiiaion 1"'
On the pah thovward itsholding, the Court made several puzzling points. Fle Court
emphasized that arbitration clauses, like contracts, rest on mutual agreintr. 149 Tlheref re.,
requiring class arbitration when the agrement expressly reiects it is a, odds witi the spirit
of contract law.'5 Noneiteless. tie court recognized that mosr consumer contracts today art
contracts of adhesion ' Adhesion contracts de, muniuality5 2 tile
corerstone of contract
lav, yet the Court finds them permissible in fiae Ccourt s vitw, it sems., the undue surprise
tlia results fom a defendant being firced r. arbitrae againsr a class is incre distressing rhan
fi inusice that results from a plaintiff being fIrced tc arbitrate according iounconsciconable
Furlhermor i, e Curtri montdunia an unwarranted attack un class arbitrmicn. even
rhose to which consent is given"
kx i on t
Relying
the Court explained tha class
arbitration is compleitel differen than bilateral arbitration 15 'Fle Court said that rhe benefits
of arbitration infonnalix and spetd art Lest when the arbitration is class wide 151 Net,
rhe Court explained that., when rhe FAA was drafted, Congress did not inrend fCr an arbitrator
7
partis" due process rightis:)
a task thi the judge
performs in class actions. Finallyi tie Court said thi class arbitraion poses ro manx risks
fi defendantss
These argumems, while nor entirel lacking merit, have valid
counterargunitns, which will be exlored in Part II of this Not
The Court also used a slippery slope argument to rebut the Concepcions' argument
that class waivers are unconscionable."19 Like arbitration agreements with class waivers,
arbitration agreements that fail to abide by the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court reasoned,
could be held to be unconscionable as well. 1" But, the Court continued, if a court was to hold
that arbitration agreements that fail to abide by the Federal Rules of Evidence are
unconscionable and, therefore, covered by the savings clause of the FAA, that holding would

ro be responsible for protectingile

See id.
at 1748. Not only did the Court state that the Discover Bank rule is not the kind of valid contract
defense to which the savings clause applies, but it further stated that the Discover Bank rule is merely a state
law standing as an obstacle to the accomplishment ot fte FAA's objectives." Id
4See id.
1&8 See id.at 1750.

1&9See id.
at 1745.
151Id.at

1750-51.

Id. at 1750.
'2 See 22 N.Y. JUR. 2D CONTIRACTS § 2 (2013).
See Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1750-51.
154See id.
at 1751-53.
155id.at 1750.
15,id.at 1751.
Id. at 1751-52.
Id. at 1752.
"5 See id. at 1747.
160 id.
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be "absolutely inconsistent with
the provisions of the act."''
"The act cannot be held to
2
destroy itself," the Court said. '
However, there is a crucial difference between waiving class procedures and
waiving the use of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and that difference is relevant to the
vindication of a federal right analysis. Waiving use of the Federal Rules of Evidence will
never make asserting a claim impossible. In contrast, as was held by the Court in Amex 111,
waiving the opportunity to utilize class procedures can make asserting a claim practically
impossible.'63
D) The Aftermath of Concepcion
The Second Circuit interpreted Concepcion as resolving the conflict between a state
law and the FAA, but felt that the Court left unanswered how the FAA would fare when in
conflict with a federal law, under a vindication of federal rights analysis. 164
The Amex case bounced between the courts due to contemporaneous changes in
Supreme Court precedent.1 6 But the underlining facts of the case remained as follows:
Plaintiffs, a group of merchants, contracted with Amex to accept American Express charge
cards.166 These cards, as opposed to credit or debit cards, were attractive to merchants
because affluent customers carry them. 6 Amex, realizing this, charged high "merchant
discount fees," and required that the merchants accept credit and debit cards as well. 16"
Furthermore, the contract that the merchants had with
Amex required that the merchants
6 9
arbitration.1
in
claims
class
pursue
to
right
their
waive
Substantively, the plaintiffs argued that, by requiring them to "honor all cards" and
pay the high merchant discount fees, Amex violated § I of the Sherman Act. 7 Procedurally,
the plaintiffs argued that the class action waiver was unenforceable.7 The defendant argued
that class action arbitration waivers were per se enforceable, in light of the Supreme Court's
ruling in Stolt-ielsen and Concepcion.172 However, the Court of Appeals stated that StoltNielsen and Concepcion did not demand that all class waivers be deemed per se
enforceable. 17 1 In addition, the court explained that those two cases did not address the issue
161id.at

1748.
Id. (quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 446 (1907)).
See Amex II, 667 F.3d at 215-16.
4 See idat213.
165See id.
at 206. The Supreme Court granted defendant-appellant Amex certiorari, but remanded the case to
the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, to reconsider the enforceability of the class action waiver
in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Stolt-Xielsen. Id. The Second Circuit stood by its original decision,
and defendant-appellant filed another Wit of ceriorari. Id. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court issued the
Concepcion decision, and, therefore, the Second Circuit agreed to hear arguments in the Amex case-againand determine whether Concepcion would alter its ruling. Id.
'6 -d. at 207.
167 id.
161id.at 208.
161id.at 209.
170Id. at 208.
171Id. at
210.
172Id. at 212.
1
id. at 2 14.
2
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at the heart of Amex 111: whether a class waiver can be enforced when such enforcement
would preclude the plaintiffs from vindicating their federal statutory rights.'
Therefore,
Stolt-N\ielsen and Concepcion did not alter the Court of Appeals' prior rulings that such a
waiver could not be enforced. 1'
When answering the question whether a class waiver can be enforced when such
enforcement would preclude the plaintiffs from vindicating their federal statutory rights, the
court cited Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Cofp.176 The court explained that, although
Gilmer emphasized that arbitration of statutory claims is permissible, the decision rested on
the premise that arbitration was an adequate forum to vindicate the statutory right at issue,
and that arbitrating the claim did not impede the statute's social aims. 177 However, the court
said the premise is destroyed in cases like Amex 111, where the arbitration agreement itself
prevents the vindication of a statutory right. 17' The mandatory arbitration clause in the Amex
MIIagreement precluded class procedures, making it impossible for plaintiffs to maintain their
claim, and, thus, depriving them of the protections of the law. 179 The social aims of the
legislation would not be achieved if the Amex 111 plaintiffs were forced to arbitrate
individually."i " Therefore, the court concluded, Gilmer was not an obstacle for plaintiffs like
those in Amex 111.181 The court cited Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chijsler Plymouth,
Inc. 182 to explain types of arbitration clauses that undermine the Gilmer premise,"' such as an
arbitration agreement84 that includes a waiver of a party's right to seek a statutory remedy for
antitrust violations. 1
Next, the Court of Appeals reiterated the Supreme Court's decision in Green Tree
Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph to support the holding that arbitration of the
merchants' claims was unenforceable. 185 In Green Tree, the Supreme Court held that the cost
of bilateral arbitration is a valid ground for finding it to be an ineffective forum for the
vindication of a federal right, but the plaintiff has the burden of showing that arbitration

171
175
17'

id. at 2 12.
id. at 2 18.
500 U.S. 20 (1991). In Gilmer, the plaintiff filed a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

(ADEA). Id. at 23. The plaintiff alleged that he was fired from his position as manager of a brokerage firm in
violation of the ADEA. id. The defendant moved to compel arbitration of the claim, arguing that the plaintiff
had signed an agreement to be bound by NYSE Rules when he became a securities representative, and the
NYSE Rules required mandatory arbitration of disputes. Id. at 24. The Court held that the plaintiff was
obligated to arbitrate because precedent demonstrated that statutorN claims were arbitrable, and that the
plaintiffs did not show that the ADEA was intended to preclude a waiver ofjudicial remedies. id. at 35.
17' Amex II, 667 F.3d at 216.
179 Id.

171 Seeid. at 2 17.
'

See id. at 2 18.

181 ](d.

1' 473 U.S. 614 (1985). In Jfitsubishi, a Puerto Rican car dealer alleged that a Japanese manufacturer violated
the Sherman Act. Id. at 619. The paries had an arbitration clause in their sales contract, and the manufacturer

moved to compel arbitration. Id. at 620-21. The dealer argued that the foreign commerce antitrust claims were
not arbitrable; however, the Supreme Court rejected this argument. Id.
See Amex 11I, 667 F.3d at 214.
I]d. at 214-15.
185 Seeid. at 2 16.
's
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would be prohibitively expensive. S86 The court explained that Green Tree has never been
overruled, l' and that the plaintiffs in Amex III met the Green Tree burden."'
During November 2012, the Supreme Court granted Amex certiorari in order to
answer the certified question, "W'hether the Federal Arbiaton Act persiiis courls, inivokhig
ie 'federal substanive law of arbiIrability,' to nvalida le arbitraion agreenlews on !he
ground thai ihey do no! permi! class arbiIration of a federal-Iaw claim. 1s9 Although legal
scholars predicted that the Supreme Court would answer this question affirmatively, because
such an analysis conforms to Supreme Court precedent and ensures that the federal antitrust
statute operates as intended,' the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's ruling.' 9 '
Nonetheless, the time is ripe for FINRA to create a rule for class actions in
arbitration. Although broker/dealers may legally include mandatory, bilateral arbitration
clauses in their contracts, they may not want to because of the public's swift criticism of
Italian Colors. 92 If FINRA develops class procedures, broker/dealers may voluntarily
arbitrate with plaintiffs on a class-wide basis, thereby saving broker/dealers reputational costs
and boosting bottom lines. Moreover, commentators suggest that the Supreme Court's3
distaste for class actions and class arbitration modeled after FRCP 23 colored its decision.'
Accordingly, Italian Colors should not deter FINRA's from developing class procedures
different than those under FRCP 23.
PART I: RALLYING THE TROOPS TO CHANGE FINRlA'S RULES
FINRA should change its rule prohibiting class actions in arbitration because: (1)
the rule is an obstacle to plaintiffs vindicating their federal securities rights; 194 (2) the rule

86

id. The plaintiff in Green Tree was unable to meet the burden of showing that arbitration would be

prohibitively expensive. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabana v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000)).
"7 See Amex ll, supra note 25, at 216.
",' See id. at 217-19. Plaintiffs hired an expert economist, who explained, "Thc inedian volime inerchanrt, wih
half of fie imned plaintiff, having iore and half having less Ainerican Express charge volme, and having
rcoifled $230,343 Amcricayi l-xpcss Card sonu-e ii 2003, r _ht exnet tour-year da,.agcs of $,75
$5,252 when trebled.. fThe argest voime named plaintli merchant. with reporocd Ainerican Express 'ard
iiime of $160,74 in 200 might expect fomr-year damages of };12.t50, or $3iZ,54' when trebled." J4 a.
218. Thcre.c, the e'onoist :cnc juded,'it
awould
iiot be mio"hilc
.i
an indivi"dua plaintiff ..to
, oursue
individial arbitraron or higarion where the 'ant
of-pocket costs, Just tor the expert economic study and
serv ices, s oild be a, least severa hmndred hou sand dollars. -mad might exceed I million. ' 1.
'89See Am. Express Co. v. It/lian Colors Restaurant, SCOTUSBLoG, http://www.scotusblog.comcasefilesicasesiamerican-express-co-v-italian-colors-restaurant/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2013).
"0 See, e.g, Ellen Meriwether, Class Action Waiver and the Effecte indicatio Docorin' at the
AntiirustArbitrationCrossroads,26 rs1sRu s. Summer 2012, at 67, 70.
'.' Italian Colors Restaurant, No. 12-133, slip op. at 9.
12 See, e.g, Katherine V.W. Stone, Supreme CourtApproves Use of Foox Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer
Rights, iUFFINGTON POST (June 21, 2013, 2:04 AM), http:/huffingtonpost.com/katerine-vw-stone/supremecourt-approves-us b_3476378.html.
'

See Philip Bump, The Problen wi/

the Supreme Court s Amex Decision, Class Action and You, THE

ATLAN'FiC WIRE (June 20, 2013), http: /www.theatlanicwire. com/national/201 3/O6/s preme-court-americanexpress-italias-colors/66443/.
194 See generall Amex 111 667 F.3d 204.
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chafes against the United States' pro-arbitration policy; 195 and (3) the rule finds its support in
weak arguments.' 96
Agreements between broker/dealers and investors to arbitrate under FINRA rules
undermine the Gilmer premise' 9' because the arbitration forum under such agreements does
not permit the vindication of investors' federal securities rights. Like the antitrust claims in
Amex III, small investor claims against broker/dealers under the '34 Act can be fact intensive,
and, thus, costly to pursue in arbitration. '9 If these costs outweigh the potential arbitration
award, investors abandon their claims and broker/dealers continue to perpetuate fiaud. 9 2 °
Furthermore, it is difficult for investors with small claims to retain legal counsel. 0
The SEC's website encourages investors with small claims to contact securities arbitration
clinics run by law schools. 2) 1 However, these clinics only exist in ('aiffrnia, D)istrict 2of2
Nev Jerse, Nevw York, aiid Pe sylvania . 0
S,
i
1
(olubia, Florida,,
Additionally, many securities atbitration clinics place a $100,000 dollar maximum on the
claims that they will take. °3 Although FINR.A allows investors to arbitrate pro se, studies
show that investors with legal representation fate much better than pro se investors in
arbitrations.
If investors could arbitrate their securities claims as a class, they could pool their
resources to cover costs such as attorney's fees. In addition, atbitrating as a class would
attract an attorney because the small claims would become one large claim. Therefore,
FINRA is preventing some investor plaintiffs from vindicating their rights under the '34 Act
by not allowing class procedures in arbitration. 205 FINRA is permitting broker/dealer power
to expand to a degree that frustrates the '34 Act's purpose of rectifying ihe imbalance in
power between broker/dealers and invests6
FINRA could argue ithia investors may file a courtrocmin class action io vindicame
their federal securtieis rights Hwever, ithis contradicts he federal policy of enforcing

See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011).
See Tumbull, supra note 41(manuscript at 14-15).
The Gilmer premise is that statutory claims are arbitrable. See Amex Iii,667 F.3d at 216.
Sci. A ' rankci Sen. Robert M. endez & SCl. Richard B,u-ent ha Senators Urge SEC to Oppose Forced
ArbitrationforShareholder Disputes, 9 No. 3 SEC. LITIG. REP., March 2012, at 19,19.
' "Investors with smaller losses tend to join class action lawsuits because the attorney's fees and costs
associated with joining a class action are typically less than those associated with bringing an individual
"g

FINRA

arbitration

action."

Class Action

vs. Securities Arbitration, MITCHELL

htp:/www.mitchelI-attorneys.coin/egal-articles/class-action-vs-securities-arbitration/
2013).

&

ASSOCIATS,

(last visited Feb. 16,

211 See Arbitration/lediationC/inics in California, Districto Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Nell

Jersey, Ne,' York, and Pennsylvania, SEC, http:Hwww.sec.gov/answersiarbelin.htm# (last modified Mar. 8,
2013).
201

d.

202 id.
203 See id.

204See Jane Bryant Quinn, 'Smal' ClainantsAgainst Brokers Face Tough Odds, BALT. SUN, May 26, 1997,

http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1997-05-26/business/1997146091
arbitration-lawyers-investors ("Claims of
$10,000 to $25,000 are generally heard before a single arbitrator. When these investors went lawyerless, they
were 12 percent less likely to win."
205 See Amex 1in, 667 F.3d 204.

206See Lee Applebaum, Comment, Predispute Arbitration Agieements Benhveei Brokers aid investors: The
Extension ofWilko to Section 1O(b) Claims, 46 MD. L. REv. 339, 341 (1987).
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arbitration agrmints
TileSupreme Couri has said thal § 2 of the FAA embodies a
"liberal federal policy favoring arbitration. '208 and rjpe "fundarminial principle that arbitration
is a matter of cornractY 2° According, wihei burker/dealtrs make agreemins ioarbihrae
with investors, Lhey should be enforced, unless hire is a valid conract defense agains
enforceeniti
Arbitration has many well docunmited benfefits, such as efficieicy and
eicon.

10 which are desirable iu broker/dealers in dispuits with investors.2

1

Therefore,

class actions in arbitrations would balance h competing initresrs of broker/dealers and
invtsors and harmonize ihe FAA with the '34 Act
Moreover, FINRA should ignore the anti-class action in arbitration propaganda
because the criticisms of class action arbitration unravel when poked and prodded. Critics of
class action arbitration believe that it changes the nature of bilateral arbitration to such a
degree that introducing a class into the forum extinguishes arbitration's benefits. 2 2 For
example, some critics argue that class action arbitration is too slow, requires formality and
does not offer defendants protection against risk of in terrorem settlements.

1

However,

these criticisms are misleading and have been rejected by academic commentators.
First, the criticisms are erroneously based on a comparison between bilateral
arbitration and class action arbitration, "apples and oranges." 1 The correct comparison
should be one between class action arbitration and class action litigation. 2" ' Second, although
statistics suggest that the average class action arbitration consumes more time than the
average bilateral arbitration, statistics also show that class action arbitrations take less time
than class action litigation, on average.217 Third, there is no empirical evidence that would
suggest that class action arbitration is ill fitting for the high stakes parties face when
defending against class claims. 2"
PART III: WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION-AMERICAN CLASS ACTIONS
Although class action arbitration is more advantageous than its critics suggest, class
action, as it stands under FRCP 23, should not be transplanted into FINRA arbitrations. In
U.S. Federal Courts, FRCP 23 governs class actions. 2 ' 9 FRCP 23 is important to consider

See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011).
Id. at 1745 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,23 (1983)).
209id. (quoting Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v.Jackson, 130 S.Ct 2772, 2776 (2010)).
210See Thomas Campbell, Roxane Busey & Peter Koch, Arbitrating Antitrust Claims the Road Less
21,

20

Traveled, 19 ANTrrRUST, Fall 2004, at8,8.
See Tamara Hofibuhr-Seelman, The Future of Alandatoi, Securities Arbitration Under the Dodd-Frank

21

Act, 13 TIlE BUSINESS SUIT (DRI), No. 9, 2013, available at http:iclients.criticalimpact.com/newsletter/
newsletlercontentshowl .cfmcontentid2584&id-417.
212 See Turnbull, supra note 41(manuscript at 14-15).
213 td.
214 See id. (manuscript at 15).
215 id.
216 id.

217See id.
21 i]d.
219 SI. Strong, Resolving Mass Legal Disputes Through Class Arhitration: The United States and Canada
Compared,37 N.C.J. INTI L. & COm. REG. 921, 928 (2011-2012).
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when assessing the viability of class arbitration because the Rule has served as a template
for
221
non-FINRA class action arbitration, 2 and contrasts with English group litigation rules.
FRCP 23 sets stringent requirements for class certification. 2 2 Under the Rule, a
member (or members) of a class must meet four prerequisites to sue on behalf of the class:
numerosity, commonality, representativeness, and fairness.
If these prerequisites are not
met, then the litigants may not sue as a class. However, even if these prerequisites are met,
the class action may be maintained only if: (1) the litigation of the claims individually would
create the risk of inconsistent judgments or would be dispositive of the rights of non-parties;
224and (2) the necessary relief would be appropriate for the class as a whole, 22ior a class
22
action is the best mode of dispute resolution, under the circumstances. 6
Since 1966, a defining and controversial characteristic of the American class action
has been its opt-out system, meaning that those who are similarly situated to the class are
automatically added to the class, and must affimatively request exclusion to remove
themselves.227 The opt-out system presents two issues: (1)classes are too large because, once
litigants are automatically added to the class, there is little incentive to leave; and (2) the due
process rights of absent claimants are vulnerable to attack.
Nonetheless, in regard to the
latter issue, the Supreme Court has held that binding an out-of-state party to class litigation,
even one who has no contacts within that state, is constitutional, provided that the party is
afforded notice and opportunity to be heard, opportunity to participate in the litigation, and
opportunity to request exclusion from the litigation. 2 The judge is responsible for protecting
the litigants' due process rights, making him an important player in class actions. 23
Although FRCP 23 lists many requirements for maintaining a class action, it does
not clearly define what a class or class action iS.23 ' For example, the numerosity requirement
is vague and does not say how many plaintiffs are needed to create a class. 212 Congress has
enacted statutes
with definitions for class actions; however, these definitions are
23
inconsistent.

20 See S.I. Strong, Enfbrcing Class Arbitraton In the InternaionalSphere: Due Process and Public Policy

Concerns,30 U. PA.J.INT'L 1,14 (2008).
221See, e.g, Tumbull, supra note 41 (manuscript at 27).
22 See FED. R. CIv. P. 23.
223See Strong, supra note 219, at 930.
224FED.

R. CIr. P. 23(b)(1).

225 id. (b)(2).

226id.(b)(3) ("The matters pertinent to these findings include: (A) the class members' interests in individually

controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already begun by or against class members: (C) the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D)the likely difficulties in managing a
class action.").
22'Dunin-Waswicz, supranote 135, at 293.
229 Td.

229id.(citing Philips Petroleum Co v.Shutts, 427 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985)).
230See id; Strong,supra note 220, at 18.
231See FED. R. Cv.P.23(a).
232See id.
233Compare Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U,S.C, § 1711 (2011), wiith
Securities Litigaeion Unilorm

Standards Act of P79,, 15 U.S,C. § 77p (2011).
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For example, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 provides: (1) a class is "all of
the class members in a class action;" (2) class members are "the persons (named or unnamed)
who fall within the definition of the proposed or certified class in a class action;" and (3) a
class action is "any civil action filed in a district court of the United States under rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or any civil action that is removed to a district court of
the United States that was originally filed under a State statute or rule of judicial procedure
authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more representatives as a class action. ,
Furthermore, the Act exempts classes of less than 100 members from some of its
provisions.
In contrast, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 defines a
"coyte class action" as "any single lawsuit in whicl (1) darnages art suuglii on behalf of
inere ilmn 50 persons or prospective class members, and quesirns uf lawx or faci coinon le,
iliose persons or members of tire prspective class, willioui reference lo issues of
individualized reliance un an alleged misst-mntin or omission, predmine cover ani
questions affeciing only individual persons or members: or (2) one or more namied parties
sek i.o recover damages urn a reprsentmaive basis on behalf of themselves and oilier unnamed
pariies similarly siiuated, and questions of law or fact cominionc, those persons r ineinbers
of lerospeti class predominate over anx questions affecting only individual persons or
intinbers.
The courts, which have great discretion when determining whether a claim is
appropriate for class treatment, have not offered clear guidance regarding what a class action
is either.21 7 For some courts, 13 members were sufficient, yet for other courts, 300 members
were not sufficient to meet the numerosity requirement. 38 Additionally, courts differ in the
amount of scrutiny applied when determining
whether certain factual differences between the
. 239
plaintiffs' claims destroy commonality.
Therefore, it is possible that claims deserving of
class treatment fail to make it to court.
Furthermore, FINRA perpetuates the legislature's vagueness with regard to class
actions by not defining class actions in the rule prohibiting them. FINRA Rule 12204 Class
Action Claims states, "(a) Class action claims may not be arbitrated under the Code. (b) Any
claim that is based upon the same facts and law, and involves the same defendants as in a
court-certified class action or a putative class action, or that is ordered by a court for classwide arbitration at a forumn not sponsored by a self-regulatory organization, shall not be
arbitrated under the Code... 240 By failing to explain what a class action is, FINRA has given
itself broad discretion and has created the risk of arbitrary and inconsistent rejections of
claims.
.
-24I
Another concern American class actions raise is that they are "entrepreneurial;
class counsel has a great deal of control over the case, selects the class representatives, and
234Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 ',S,C. § 1711 (2011).
23 Id. §1D2,
231Securities Litigaion Unitorm Standards Act of 1
155°<',S,C. § 77p (201 1).
237See Sandrik, supra note 35, at 199-200.
231id. at 200. However, many cases have held that forty is an appropriate number of plaintiffs to fulfill the

numerosity requirement. Id. Therefore, defendants usually do not contest numerosity. id.
202-03.
240FINRA Rule 12204, supra note 20.
24' Debra Lyn Bassett The Futureof InternationalClass Actions, 18 SW. J. INTL L. 21,23-24 (2011).
239 M. at
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employs contingent fee agreements, whereby the firm will be paid in an amount
disproportionately greater than the actual benefit the class receives. 2' 2
Furthermore,
banks, brokerages and corporations, the likely defendants in class actions prior to the rise in
popularity of class waivers,
criticize class actions because they feel that the consolidation
of cases increases their risk of having to pay a huge award. 2 Rather than take that risk, they
usually settle, even if the merits of the claim are questionable.
Noting these criticisms,
Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 . 24 Foreign parties are
also critical of class actions. 24 7 Foreigners denounce class actions because private individuals,
instead of public officials, pursue the claims 24for the class, and the class can receive monetary
damages, instead of merely injunctive relief. 1
But despite these pitfalls, class actions serve an important function they allow
private individuals to litigate claims. 249 As a result, public agencies, which are otherwise
responsible for prosecuting claims of fraud and public wrongs, have a more manageable
caseload and preserve their resources. 2 - Additional benefits of class actions include: (1) the
reduction of duplicative discovery, motion practice, and pretrial procedures; (2) consistent
results; (3) no overlapping or repetitive punishment; and (4) poietial recoveries fcr small
claims bx iliose wiho ima noi even know
iliey were iniured and "almosi certinlx wcu1d noi
25 1
bxl-er ito sue even if iieF-lhad known.,
Although foreigners ate especially vocal about the problems associated with class
actions, increasing numbers of foreign investors are members of securities class actions in the
United States. 2 2 This increase suggests that class action atbitration would not stifle
international investing in U.S. markets, even if subject to a rule like FRCP 23,, and that
foreign investors ate not strictly opposed to group procedures. Many countries are even
developing their own group procedures.
Therefore, securities law is ripe for the further
development of class procedures in atbitration.
PART IV: WEAPON OF CHOICE, ENGLAND'S GLO
English civil procedure was codified in 2000 as Civil Procedure Rules ("CPR").
This legislation was enacted as a response to a report addressing procedure issued by the

...
Id. at 24.
supra note 220, at 15.

243 Strong,

24'
J W
ea
us
,
245 Dunin-Waswicz, supranote 135, at 293.

(1 I ; & CO

'M!.

PRO-S. 5. 6

(

/

er

2001 ).

...
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was enacted to curb the alleged abuses of in securities
class actions by requiring heightened pleading standards and additional class qualifications. See Weiss, supra
note 244 for an in depth discussion of the Act.
24 See Strong, supra note 220, at 25-26.
141 Id. The European Directive requires that all Member States of the European Union allow consumer
associations or independent public bodies to file group litigation on behalf of plaintiffs. Id.
24' E.g, Turnbull, supranote 41 (manuscript at 10).
id.
251Strong, supra note 220, at 15-16.
See Dunin-Waswicz, supra note 135, at 294.
250

25 See, e.g., L. REFORNI COMIMfN, CONSULTATION PAPER ON MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION (July 2003), available
0
at http:/,wv.laaweform.ie/ fileupload/CPS %o202004%
o2Oand%o20older/CPMutio20Party%2OLitigation.pdf
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England and Wales High Court.
The report recognized the need for aggregate litigation,
due to the high costs associated with individual litigation , as well as a faster and simpler
alternative to bilateral litigation. s6
CPR 19 covers multi-paity litigation.
Under the rule, collective redress may be
maintained by: "(1) adding parties to an existing action or consolidating claims; (2)
representative claims; and (3) the Group Litigation Order ("GLO")," 258the procedure best
suited for implantation into FINRA arbitrations.
A GLO is "an order...to provide for the case management of claims which give rise
to common or related issues of fact or law ."259 GLOs are the primary multi-party procedure
used in England. 260 When introduced, GLOs were considered a radical departure from
existing litigation procedures. 26 1 Unlike litigation previously, GLOs entail pre-action
disclosures by the parties, provide institutionalized opportunities for mediation to encourage
early settlement, and give the courts the power to restrict evidence or issues to maintain cost
efficiency and fairness .
Plaintiffs, defendants or the judge, sue sponte, may apply for a GLO.26 The
application for a GLO should include: "asummary of the nature of the litigation; the number
and nature of the claims already issued; 264 the number of parties likely to be involved; the
common issues of fact or law that are likely to arise; and any matters distinguishing small
groups of claims within the wider group."
7
6
Prior to applying for a GLO, an applicant hires a solicitor2 to act on his behalf.,
The solicitor will contact the Law Society,1x which operates a Multi-Party Action
Information Service.2" 9 The Multi-Party Action Information Service acts as a matchmaker for
perspective applicants and their solicitors, allowing solicitors handling similar claims to join
254See Tumbull, supra note 41 (manuscript at 20).
255See id. It is Worth noting that this argument resembles the plaintiffs' argument in Amex III. See Amex
111,667 F.3d at 210-11.
25,See David Collins, Public Funding of Class Actions and the Experience iit/i English Group Proceedings,
31 MAN,,T
L.J.
211,213 (2005).
2' Turnbull, supra note
25M ]d.

41(manuscript at21).

251ld.(quoting CPR 19.10).
260ld(manuscript at 23). However, only seventy-nine GLOs are recorded on the Queens' Bench Division of
the High Court's register. Id.(manuscript at 24). This is most likely because insurance, which isimportant in
England's "loser pays" system, is difficult to obtain in light
of the heightened stakes of GLOs. Id
261Christopher Hodges, Multi-Party Actions: A European Approach, 11 DLKE J.COMP. & INT'L L.321, 345
(2001).
2132 Id.
2" L. REFORNICOMM'N,supra note 253, at47.

24 Under English law, the phrase "issue a claim" is similar to the phrase "file a claim" under U.S. law, except
the English court issues the claim at the request of the claimant, while the claimant files the claim in U.S. court.
265 L. REFORM COMM'N, supra note 253, at 47.

2136Someone who provides legal guidance in England, usually in a particular field of law. See Solicitor in
England and Males, LAW REFORNI SOCIETY (May 2005), http:/iwww.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uklisitecontelt/

documents/policyandlaw/businessandcommercialoccsheetsol icitorenglandwales pdf view-Binarv.
267 L. REFORM COMM'N, supra note 253, at 47.

213Id. The Law Society is an organization providing resources and training for solicitors. THE LAW SOCIETY
OF ENGLAND AND WALES, http:iihiiwii.1cmsociet3,.oig.uk (last visited Feb. 15 2013).
26' L. REFORM COMM'N, supra note 253, at 47.
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together and form a Solicitors' Group .27 The Solicitors' Group will choose a lead solicitor to
act as its representative. 27 12The
lead solicitor will apply for the GLO on behalf of the group
72
and litigate the GLO issues.
Once the application is made, the GLO will be granted upon approval of the Lord
Chief Justice, when the proceeding is in the Chancery Division, or the Vice Chancellor, when
the proceeding is in a county court . 2
A Group Register is generated, which contains
information regarding the cases under the GLO.. Other claimants wishing' 275
to have their
claims included in the GLO may apply to be added to the Register and opt-in."
One judge takes responsibility for managing the cases comprising the GLO, 27" and
has broad discretion when managing GLO litigation.. For example, the judge defines the
GLO issue and may designate one of the claims in the GLO as a test case. 2 78 A test case is the
litigation of a single claim in the GLO that will serve as precedent for the other cases in the
GLO. 279 Additionally, the judge managing a GLO may° set a deadline for adding claims to the
Register and may remove a case from the Register. 1
GLO judgments are binding on all cases on the Register, but only with regard to the
specific GLO issue or issues common to all the cases. 28 The GLO claimants are responsible
for sharing the costs of litigation, with each claimant liable for an equal proportion of the
common costs. 282 However, the costs unique to an individual claim are not dispersed among
the group. 28GLOs are not class actions.
The rules covering GLOs (CPR 19.10-.15) are
intentionally simple and brief in order to provide maximum flexibility. 28
The only
2 6
requirements for those claimants seeking a GLO are commonality and numerosity. 8
Additionally, the aforementioned requirements are not as restrictive as commonality and
numerosity under FRCP 23.
For example, FRCP 23(a)(2) requires that the claims have
"common issues of fact or law," however "related" issues can satisfy CPR 19.10. 2 8
Likewise, FRCP 23(a)(1) requires that "the class is so numerous thatjoinder of all members is
impracticable," while CPR 19.11 merely requires that "there are likely to be a number of

270

id.

271 id.
272 id.
273 Id.
274

Id. at 48.

275 Id.

276 id.

at 46.

277 id. at 48.
278 id.

279Hodges, supra note 261, at 345.
2'0 L. R-EFORNM
COMM'N, supra note 253, at 48.

Turnbull, supra note 41 (manuscript at 22).
supra note 250, at 48-49.
213 id. at 49.
84 See Tumbl, supra note 41 (manuscript at 27).
285 Hodges, supra note 261, at 345.
28'Turnbull, supra note 41 (manuscript at 27).
211 Id. (manuscript at 28).
28

212 L. REFORM COMM'N,

288 id.
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claims giving rise to the GLO issues." 289 Therefore, it is easier for plaintiffs to qualify for a
GLO than a class action.
Furthermore, GLOs are less complex than class actions.
While FRCP 23 provides
for three distinct types of classes, each with its own requirements, there are no additional

formal subdivisions or requirements for a GLO.292 Another notable difference between GLOs
and class actions is that GLOs are non-representative, meaning that they are networks of
separate actions, rather than a single action like their American counterpart. 3 Therefore, the
claims each maintain their individual character to some extent, 294 and individual claimants
possess more control than in representative procedures like class actions. Moreover, GLOs
are opt-in only, 25 providing for smaller class sizes than in opt-out actions.
Therefore, FINRA should delete Rules 12204 and 12312, and adopt the following
new Class Action in Arbitration Rule, based on England's CPR 19.10, 19.12 and 19.14:

A FINRA arbitrator may award a Class Action Designation in Arbitration
for a claim where there are more than two claims2 96 relating to the Class
Issues. A Class Action
in Arbitration serves as a network of related,
individual claims.
An
arbitrator
may~.
make an award of a.. Class
Action
L,
297Th
ri
t
Designation at the request of any party or on his own initiative
The right
to request a Class Action Designation in Arbitration cannot be waived via
contract 2 8 When an arbitrator awards a Class Action designation
in Arbitration he must: (a) notify FINRA within seven days in writing and
(b) give a reasoned award identifying the Class Issues. 299 FINRA will
establish and maintain a public online Register at the FINRA website of all
cases that are part of the Class Action in Arbitration. Any similarly
situated claimants may opt-in to the Class Action in Arbitration.
The Class arbitrator may
remove a claim from the Class Register at the
request of the claimant in that claim.300
When
an
award
determining a claim included in the Class Register of a Class Action in
Arbitration and the award relates to one or more of the Class Issues, the
award (the "Class Award") applies to all cases contained in the Class

289

Id

290

Id.

291 See

id.

212i.(man uscript at 27).
293 id.
294 id.
295

Id.

2" GLOs do not have a two plaintiff minimum. However, the Class Action in Arbitration Rule FINRA should
adopt does in order to give the Rule clarity regarding class size.
297id.(manuscript at 37).
29'The ban on waiving the right to request a Class Action in Arbitration is unique to the new Rule and isnot
required by aGLO.
299 Id. (manuscript at37-8).
"o id.(manuscript at 39).
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Register. 301 A Class Award must: be a
reasoned award, list all the
Class Issues that it determines, and list all the claims which
involve
those Class Issues. 30
Like GLOs, the aforementioned Rule is opt-in, and it permits remroval of a claim
when requested by the claimant in that claim. Likewise, the Rule is non-representative, and
the Class Award is only binding on the group issues it addresses. Furthermore, the Rule
allows for the publication of information about the Class Action in Arbitration on the Internet,
and it allows FINRA to conserve its resources by allowing multiple claims to be handled at
once.
FINRA should adopt the new Rule because it preserves the benefits of courtroom
class actions. Plaintiffs can afford to vindicate their federal securities rights because the rule
provides a cost sharing mechanism. Furthermore, like courtroom class actions, individuals
may join together to uncover broker/dealer abuses, thus aiding the SEC in its investigatory
role and providing a public benefit. However, unlike class actions, Class Action in
Arbitration is clearly defined by the new Rule. Furthermore, Class Action in Arbitration
protects broker/dealers from the risks normally associated with class actions because: (1) the
Class Action in Arbitration is only binding on the entire class with regard to the Class Action
in Arbitration Issue, and (2) the Class Action in Arbitration is opt-in, preventing class sizes
from growing impermissibly large.
FINRA should also adopt the new Rule because it preserves arbitration's benefits.
The new rule maintains the informality and flexibility normally attributed to arbitration. The
efficiency of arbitration is not lost under the new Rule because the Class Action in Arbitration
is opt-in. Therefore, a cumbersome class that would slow the arbitration is unlikely. In
addition, lay jurors, who may have difficulties understanding complex securities disputes,
would not determine the awards resulting from the Class Action in Arbitration. 0 Instead, an
arbitrator or arbitration panel with more experience handling securities claims than courtroom
juries would determine the award, thus making Class Action in Arbitration superior to class
action litigation of a securities claim. 4
CONCLUSION
The war on mandatory arbitration clauses is at fever pitch. Although the SEC has
not drawn its sword by promulgating a rule voiding such clauses, Congress and investor
advocates are urging the SEC to take arms and join the fight. The opposition, including firms
like the Carlyle Group, is pushing the war into a new frontier, from broker/dealer customer
agreements to IPO prospectuses. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court in furtherance of its
crusade against class arbitration upheld the class waiver at issue in Italian Colors.
It is behind this backdrop that FINRA should look inward and change its own rules
regarding mandatory arbitrations between broker/dealers and customer investors. Currently,
301

Id.

302 id.
See Bradley J. Bondi, FacilitatingEconomic Recovery and Sustainable Groiwth Through Reform of the
Securities Class-Action System: Exploring Arbitration As an Alternative to Litigation, 33 HARN. JL. & PUB.
POLC 607, 613-14 (2010).

4 See id.
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FINRA allows mandatory arbitrations to take place in its jurisdiction, with the caveat that the
arbitrations must be bilateral. Additionally, an investor is free to join a courtroom class
action, and broker/dealers cannot use mandatory arbitration agreements to deny investors
access to courtroom class actions.
FINRA's Rule prohibiting class actions in arbitration is problematic because it
prevents plaintiffs from vindicating their rights under the '34 Act. While courtroom class
actions are a valid forum for the vindication of a federal right, some investors are unlikely to
get there due to the numerous yet vague requirements for class certification and the court's
broad discretion in determining whether a group of plaintiffs has met the criteria to litigate as
a class.
Therefore, investors must arbitrate individually or not at all. But individual
arbitration can be prohibitively expensive. Given the economic consequences of forced
individual arbitration, an investor will drop his claim, and, thus, broker/dealers are insulated
from liability. Not only does this injure the individual investor, but also it hurts the investing
public at large. Broker/dealer violations of the Securities Exchange Act can be difficult to
detect, and, therefore, individuals pursuing their claims perform a public service.
FINRA's Rule prohibiting class action in arbitrations is also problematic because it
is an obstacle to the FAA, which places agreements to arbitrate on equal footing as other
contracts. If FINRA's members make an agreement with their customers to arbitrate, FINRA
should not allow plaintiffs to escape their obligation by joining a courtroom class action.
Furthermore, FINRA's Rule denies its members the benefits of arbitration, such as efficiency,
informality and speed.
Accordingly, FINRA should change its Rule and take both investors' and
broker/dealers' interests into account, while harmonizing the Securities Exchange Act with
the FAA. To perform this balancing of interests, FINRA should abolish its Rule prohibiting
class actions in arbitration as well as its Rule for joinder (as it muddies the waters) and create
a Rule for Class Actions in Arbitrations. The new Rule should define a class as two or more
plaintiffs. By doing so, the Rule will have concreteness, unlike FRCP 23 and the current
FINRA Rule prohibiting class actions in arbitration.
Moreover, when FINRA drafts the new Rule, it should look across the pond to
England and adopt some aspects of England's GLOs. GLOs preserve the benefits of class
actions in litigation because they enable a group of plaintiffs to share the costs of arbitration
instead of bearing them individually. However, GLOs avoid some of the pitfalls of class
action litigation. GLOs are opt-in instead of opt-out and, therefore, minimize defendants' risk
and only bind plaintiffs who have an invested interest in pursuing the claim. GLOs also have
minimal requirements for class certification, which will allow valid claims to be arbitrated. In
addition, GLOs preserve the benefits of arbitration because, like arbitration, GLOs are
procedurally flexible. The opt-in requirement of GLOs maintains arbitration's efficiency by
preventing classes from becoming unwieldy. Therefore, GLOs fit comfortably into FINRA
arbitrations.
If approved by the SEC, FINRA's Class Action in Arbitration Rule would be the
first step toward resolving the war on mandatory arbitration. The FAA and the -4 Act would
both achieve their ains without destroying one another. Therefore, now is the time for
FINRA to promulgate the Class Action in Arbitration Rule and bring both sides of the war
together and down a path toward peace.
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